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Demographic Trends for the labor
Force in the 1980s
For most of the history of the nation, there was little attention
paid by either scholars or policymakers to questions pertaining to the
demographic characteristics of the labor force. It was essentially felt
that a worker was a worker. Prior to the 1930s, the Federal government
expressed little concern for any of the economic uncertainities of life.
Under such circumstances, what difference did it make as to the sex,
race, or age composition of the labor force? But since of Depression
Decade, labor market policy has become a major concern of policymakers.
likewise, labor market analysis has also gradually'become more sophis-
ticated. Research has found that demographic factors do make a difference
with respect to such key issues as the incidence of unemployment and
labor force participation rates. Awareness of these influences could
contribute to the formulation of public policy measures that were an-
ticipatory of labor market problems rather than belatedly responsing to
them.
Unfortunately, the record of anticipatory public policy development
to demographic changes has not been good. Everyone knew, for instance,
that the post-World War II and post-Korean Conflict baby boom that lasted
from 1946 to 1962 would lead to immense youth employment problems in the
years beginning in 1964 to 1981. This cohort was well tracked by demog-
raphers but it was simply neglected by most economists and policymakers
until the lingering problem of youth unemployment became so persistant
that their needs could no longer be ignored. The result was the comprehensive
2set of youth initiatives that were enacted under the Youth Employment
and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977. As innovative and as useful
as that legislation was, it is instructful to be reminded that it came
almost at the end of the period of "baby boom" entrants into the labor
market. One cannot help but ponder how much better off the nation might
have all been if these initiatives had come in the mid-1960s when the on-
slaught began rather than almost at its end. The "manpower revolution"
of the 1960s was primarily focused on the needs of adults with only scant
recognition given to the special employment needs of youth. With the
exception of the Job Corps, whose scale has always been small but in-
tensive, the other programs for youth were usually seen as a form of
"riot insurance" rather as substantive policy developments designed to
improve the employment potential of its youthful participants.
Now as we enter the 1980s, we are faced with several more major
demographic changes. The question, as always, is will policymakers pay
attention to these trends before they occur or will they follow past
practice of ignoring future trends until they become contemporary prob-
lems?
The major trend of the 1980s will be the movement of the aforemen-
tioned large cohort of the past "baby boom years" into their young adult
years. Welcoming the declining numbers of youths, Fortune magazine has
already heralded this trend as "demography's glad tidings." By 1990
the largets single cohort of the nation's population will be composed
of people between the ages of 25 to 44 years old. With respect to the
labor force by the mid-1980s, the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts
that there will be more persons in the labor force than not in the labor
3force--inc1uding babies. As many of these people are already in the
labor forcet it is unlikely that the rapid labor force growth rates of
the 1970s will continue. It is more likely thatt as this "bulge" of
,
youths in the 1970s become young adults in the 1980st more attention
will be directed toward the types of jobs available. Jobs for youths
are largely seen as being transitory types of jobs that are desired purely
because they generate income. Young adultst howevert are concerned about
career-starting jobs. Due to this bu1get it is likely that the competition
for these types of career and advancement opportunity jobs will become
more competitive. This situation will likely create much more demands
for effective affirmative action programs than ever before.
Although the population statistics are extremely reliable (since
they are based on people already born)t the labor force projections are--
as a1ways~-somewhat more speculative.
based on certain theoretical beliefs.
For labor force projections are
ways correct given their assumptions.
Theoretical projections are al-
So what are always important are
the assumptions behind the major projections.
The BLS uses essentially three predictive models: a hig~ growth
It is not themodelt a middle growth modelt and a low growth model~
purpose of this paper to go into all the details associated with all of
these models. That would be a subject itse"' f as each has certa in be-
havioral assumptions that could be debated ~t length. All necessarily
make assumptions about future unemployment ievelst inflation rates,
fertility rates, and family practices that affect labor force partici-
pation and which are subject to extensive deviations from the initial
assumptions.
4Since the mid-1960s, the whole topic of labor force projections has
become even further comp1icated by the topic of immigration'. In 1980,
for instance, more people immigrated into the United States than in any
single year in the nation's history.
as legal immigrants or as refugees.
In that year 808,000 people entered
In addition there were at least
severa 1 hundred thousand more who entered ill ega 11y and were not appre-
hended. Over a million apprehensions of illegal immigrants were made
that year. Most illegal immigrants are not caught.
As the vast majority of immigrants from all sources are adults who
go directly into the labor force, their numbers are highly important to
the topic of labor force projections. The BLS estimates, however,
took the lower average of legal immigrants levels of 1976-1980 (of
about 400,000 persons) of whom about 63.7 percent were of prime labor
force age to include in their projections. These low estimates of future
imnigration are 1ikely to underrepresent si gnifi'cantly both the size of
the refugees and the legal flows that will occur in the 1980s. As fo r
the illegal immigrants, the BLS simply found the whole topic too dif-
ficult to handle. Hence, this critical group was simply left out of all
of the official projections. As illegal immigration will no doubt con-
tinue and probably mount in size, this omission will certainly cause
serious underestimation problems of the actual size of the labor force.
Irrmigration in all of its' forms is now so cr-itical that one of the nat"ion's
foremost demographers observed in 1980 that lIimmigration now appears to
be almost as important as fertility insofar as U.S. population growth
i.s concerned. II
5To turn to specific trends, the BLS estimates that about two-thirds
of the labor force growth from 1980 to 1995 will come from women no
matter which model they use. This increase will more than offset the
expected decline in the number of younger and older working women. The
middle growth projection, for instance, shows that by 1985, 56.4 percent
of all women will be in the labor force (up from 46 percent in 1975).
This will mean that women will represent 45 percent of the labor force in
1985 (as opposed to 40 percent in 1975). The proportion of men in the
labor force will, of course, decline over the interval.
Over this time span, the black labor force will grow at about twice
the rate of whites (i.e., 2.5 percent annual growth rate for blacks
versus 1.2 percent for whites). To the degree the'se diffe-rent: a1 growth
rates do occur, the relative proportion of the labor force that is black will
increase relative to the proportion that is white. These projected
growth rates assume that the relatively high participation rate of black
women continues and it also assumes that black male participation rates
will converge towards the comparable rates of white men. One of the most
troubling of all labor market trends in the past two decades has been
the difference in the male labor force participation rates between white
and black males. That is to say, ~lack male rates felT consistently
until 1978 when they began to increase again but only slightly. In 1979
the labor force participation rate for black males was still only 71.9
percent while it was 78.6 pecent for white males. Whether the BLS
prediction of a movement toward closing this gap between black and white
males occurs is, of course, subject as much to hope as it is to fact.
6It depends greatly on whether the national unemployment rate declines
significantly over the decade. High unemployment rates for any
particular segment of the population tend to discourage labor force par-
ticipation.
The greatest change tn the labor force of the 1980s from that of
the 1960s and 1970s will be the declining influence of youths. Since
the mid-1960s? the youth population (16 to 24 years of age) has grown
at a faster rate than the older population. Thus, even though it is
predicted that youth labor force participation will increase in the 1980s
and early 1990s, these increasing rates will be more than offset by the
decline in the absolute numbers of youth in the cohort. For men 16 to
24 years old, for instance, the decline in their numbers will be from
17.6 million youths in 1979 to 13.9 million youths in 1995. For similarly
aged women, it will be from 18.3 million to 15.3 million youths. The
result is that the annual average growth rates of youth in the labor
market will fall from the high levels of 1965 through 1979 of +3.9
percent a year to the negative growth levels qf -0.9 percent a year from
1979 to 1995. Thus, one can expect the aggregate problems of the. youth
aged population to diminish sharply over the next 15 years. This includes
not only youth economic problems but also associated youth social problems
as well.
There is, however, a troublesome issue that is submerged in these
averages for the youth labor market. Namely, the "baby boom" birth rates
for blacks and Hispanics peaked later than they did for non-Hispanic whites.
likewise, the birthrates of blacks and Hispanics have declined but at a
7much slower rate than for non-Hispanics whites. Hence, the ratio of
minority youth to the total youth population of the nation will increase
dramatically at least through 1990. The problem of youth unemployment
has always been more severe in the 1960s and 1970s for minorities than
for non-Hispanic whites. But during those decades there were also large
numbers of non-minority youths who also had significant needs for assistance.
In the 1980s, however, it is likely that youth unemployment problems will
come to be largely a minority group problem. Whether political interest
in the employment problem of youth can be sustained when these problems
are largely minority group issues is open to speculation. Already, there
are signs that national attention is beginning to turn to the problems
of older workers. This, of course, is largely a problem of non-minority
workers. As the competition for limited federal dollars increases, it
would seem that the political considerations will lead to the problems
of youth labor markets being bumped down on the priorities of the national
agenda. If this does happen, it does not auger well for the nation's
minority populations. For both blacks and Hispanics will have considerably
larger percentages of their respective members who are young than will
be the case for non-Hispanic whites in the 1980s. Minority youth also
have historically had much greater difficulty entering the labor market
than non-Hispanic whites.
Thus, it is to be expected that the competition for jobs will in-
crease dramatically in the next decade as the "baby boom" evolves itself
into the "young adult boom." The potential "productivity bonus" that
the nation should sustain from having a substantial increase in its prime
8age population can only be realized if there is a parallel commitment to
reducing the levels of unemployment from the high levels that persisted
throughout most of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Otherwise, not only,
will the IIproductivity bonusll prove to be non-existant but, also, the
competition for those remaining jobs that are available could prove to
be fierce. Many people will not advance as rapidly as they might hope.
Others will be bumped downward into jobs in which they are over qualified.
Some may be pushed out of the ranks of the employed and into active
competition with the poorly qualified and least experienced job seekers
for jobs as they become available.
Likewise, unless the nation is willing to address the question of
immigration reform in a comprehensive manner, it is likely that ntdrlYof
those people who already are the most vulnerable to unemployment will
also be further hindered by the influx of illegal immigrants and, probably,
refugees as well. As matters now stand, it is the youths, women, and
minorities who already carry much of the burden of the competition. These
groups are precisely the people who have been the special targets of the
nation's human resource initiatives. Certainly, it makes little sense
to continue to talk of the need for policy interventions to help ease the








allowing virtually uncontrolled entry by illegal immigrants into their







!a "guestworker programll--as is the Reagan Administration--at a time when
it is far from clear that there is an imminent labor shortage ahead. It
is the likelihood of the continuation of high levels of immigration (legal, ,I
!
I
9refugees, and illegal) as well as the possibility of a guest worker program
that make the entire topic of demographic projections in the labor force
even more speculative than it already is for the 1980s.
Conclusions
Thus, the demographic changes of the 1980s will present new chal-
lenges to both labor market policymakers and to labor market institutions.
The labor force is aging but it still has some acute problems with youths
that cannot be neglected. It is going to become far more competitive in
the young adult labor market due both to there being more people to
accommodate as well as there being continuing changes in the sex and
racial composition of the labor force. There will be more pressure for
greater affirmative action enforcement and, probably, there will be more
resistance to the resulting efforts to change the occupational composition
of the labor force. There will be an even greater necessity for human
resource development programs for minorities in particular if they are
to have the opportunity to compete on an equal footing for the limited
number of good jobs that will be available. The great unknowns with
respect to labor force projections are what i~ going. to happen to un-
employment and to immigration levels as a result of federal policy action
or inaction.
